![]() ![]() But if it’s neither an ontological term for our being, nor an ontical sortal that denotes precisely us, then what is it?įrom what I understand, Dasein is a specific way of being - a way of being shared by members of a community. ![]() It’s Heidegger’s basic technical term for whatever it is that’s special about us. To continue with Haugeland's probing of Dasein: Heidegger saw human Being as especial, as something unique to human beings. You do, however, have a point when saying that Heidegger's aim was to displace to centrality of consciousness. Indeed, the grammar is different: unlike ‘person’, ‘dasein’ is not used with what Quine called ‘the apparatus of divided reference’ (indefinite articles, the plural, and so on). Unlike many readers of Being and Time, Brandom is commendably sensitive to the fact that ‘dasein’ is not only not synonymous, but not even coextensive with the ordinary term ‘person’. ![]() John Haugeland of the University of Chicago argues explicitly that Dasein is not synonymous with personhood or "a person": I think that most specialists of Heidegger would take issue with your stipulation. ![]()
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